



House of Commons
Transport Committee

Ending the Scandal of Complacency: Road Safety beyond 2010

Eleventh Report of Session 2007–08

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Eleventh Report of Session 2007–08

*Report, together with formal minutes, oral and
written evidence*

*Ordered by The House of Commons
to be printed 15 October 2008*

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The Transport Committee

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Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee's email address is transcom@parliament.uk.


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1 Introduction

1. It will be fifty years this December since the first motorway opened in Britain.¹ In 1958 there were seven million motor vehicles licensed in Britain, resulting in the deaths of 6,000 people.² By 2007 the number of licensed motor vehicles and vehicle mileage covered had increased by 400%, yet deaths had halved to below 3,000 – the lowest figure since records began in 1926. This is a remarkable achievement by all involved, right across the road safety spectrum.³

Figure 1: Road traffic deaths in Great Britain 1958–2007



Sources: Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report, September 2008, Table 1a*; and Department for Transport, *Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007, November 2007, Table 8.1*.

2. And yet, as is so often pointed out in progress reviews, the deaths of three thousand people and injuries to a quarter of a million are a staggering annual toll to pay for mobility. It is inconceivable that any transport system invented today would be accepted, no matter what its benefits, if it involved this level of carnage.

3. Our witnesses pointed out how road accidents have an impact on society on multiple levels. At a personal level, road deaths are devastating not only for the victims but also for the families and friends left behind. Professor Danny Dorling of Sheffield University told us that road accidents were the largest single cause of death for people between the ages of 5 and 35 in Britain.⁴ Road accidents cost our economy about 1.5% of GDP – some £18

1 The Preston Bypass was officially opened on 5 December 1958. It now forms junctions 29–32 of the M6.

2 Department for Transport, *Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007, November 2007, Tables 8.1 and 9.1*. In 1958 there were 7,175,000 motor vehicles licensed, 107 billion vehicle kilometres and 5,970 people killed. In 2006 there were 33,369,000 motor vehicles and 511 billion vehicle kilometres; in 2007 2,946 people were killed.

3 Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report, September 2008*. This annual publication is the main source of information about casualties. As the title suggests, it provides only basic information about casualties in Northern Ireland. The figures quoted in our Report are therefore mostly for Great Britain.

4 Ev 323

billion each year.⁵ Dealing with road safety is a major item of public expenditure⁶ that extends far beyond the budgets and boundaries of the Department for Transport and its agencies. This involves not only the local highway authorities, and health and police services but also others whose involvement may not be so well appreciated.⁷ The Fire and Rescue Service, for example, now spends a large proportion of its resources on dealing with road traffic collisions.⁸ Road safety also affects wider transport policy. Making pedestrians and cyclists feel safer is crucial to promoting walking and cycling.⁹ On the railways the largest risk of a catastrophic train accident comes from road vehicles, mainly at level crossings.¹⁰

4. Few people, if any, would argue that we should not try to reduce the number of people killed and injured on our roads. Yet road safety is a contentious issue. Relatives of those killed in traffic collisions call for radical measures whilst restrictions on the rights of individuals to take risks are often strongly resisted by some motorists.¹¹ Even after detailed analysis, it is not easy to prove exactly which measures are effective. The Netherlands has seen impressive reductions in road deaths between 2004 and 2006. Yet the Dutch road safety institute SWOV concludes that “It has not been possible to find an explanation for [...] two-thirds of the decrease.”¹²

5. Even the meaning of road safety is disputed. For some, as implied by the Government’s casualty reduction target, safety is the absence of death and injury. By this count the UK does relatively well, with ‘only’ 5.4 deaths per 100,000 population – placing it sixth amongst European countries after Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.¹³ In contrast, the USA has almost 15 deaths per 100,000 population. Yet for others, road safety implies freedom from the dangers associated with motor vehicles. These dangers may not always lead to accidents but the threat can impose restrictions on the people’s daily lives, particularly for children, older people and those wishing to walk or travel on two wheels. Some of our witnesses emphasised the need to reduce dangers at source and not to unduly restrict the freedoms of vulnerable road users, which may have other, undesirable consequences.

6. In this Report, we examine the progress made in reducing death and injuries and in reducing danger to vulnerable road users. We focus on the diverging trends between deaths and serious injuries. We then identify the key actions and delivery mechanisms that we believe are needed to reduce casualties dramatically beyond 2010. In particular, we highlight the need for a step-change in approach, overseen by a high-level independent body to ensure consistent, cross-departmental support.

5 Ev 333

6 The Minister and official were unable to say what percentage of the Department for Transport’s budget was allocated for road safety. See Q 428.

7 Q 153

8 Ev 349

9 Q 312

10 Ev 315

11 Ev 133

12 “Why is the UK no longer number one for road safety fatalities?” *Local Transport Today*, 21 March 2008, pp14–17

13 Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report*, September 2008, Table 51

2 Progress towards the 2010 targets

Setting the targets

7. In 1987 the Government set the first national road safety target: to reduce casualties by one third by 2000. This was seen as groundbreaking. The main target was exceeded and, by 2000, deaths had fallen by 39% and serious injuries by 45%. The overall number of accidents and of slight injuries, however, remained unchanged in the context of a 30% increase in the number of licensed motor vehicles and a 32% increase in vehicle miles travelled.¹⁴

8. The current targets for road casualty reduction in Great Britain were published in March 2000 in *Tomorrow's Roads – safer for everyone*.¹⁵ This strategy, co-signed by the Minister for Road Safety in the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions and his counterparts in the Scottish Executive and National Assembly for Wales, set the targets to be achieved by the year 2010, taking the average of years 1994–98 as the baseline.¹⁶

9. The three targets for Great Britain were:

- A reduction of 40% in the number of people killed or seriously injured in road accidents;
- A reduction of 50% in the number of children killed or seriously injured (children are defined as being those aged under 16); and
- A reduction of 10% in the slight casualty rate, expressed as the number of people slightly injured per 100 million vehicle kilometres.

14 Department for Transport, *Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007*, November 2007, Tables 8.1 and 9.1

15 Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions, Scottish Executive and National Assembly for Wales, *Tomorrow's Roads – safer for everyone*, March 2000

16 Major aspects of road safety have been devolved to the Scottish and Welsh administrations and road safety as a whole is devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Department for Transport has provided a detailed statement of the legislative and executive competencies of the devolved administrations with regard to road safety in Ev 357

Box 1: Definitions of “killed” and “injured” used in UK road casualty statistics	
<i>“Killed:</i>	Human casualties who sustain injuries leading to death less than 30 days after the accident. (This is the usual international definition, adopted by the Vienna Convention in 1968.)
<i>“Serious injury:</i>	An injury for which a person is detained in hospital as an ‘in-patient’, injury or any of the following injuries whether or not they are detained in hospital: fractures, concussion, internal injuries, crushings, burns (excluding friction burns), severe cuts, severe general shock requiring medical treatment and injuries causing death 30 or more days after the accident. An injured casualty is recorded as seriously or slightly injured by the police on the basis of information available within a short time of the accident. This generally will not reflect the results of a medical examination, but may be influenced according to whether the casualty is hospitalised or not. Hospitalisation procedures will vary regionally.
<i>“Slight injury:</i>	An injury of a minor character such as a sprain (including neck whiplash injury), bruise or cut which are not judged to be severe, or slight shock requiring roadside assistance. This definition includes injuries not requiring medical treatment.”
<i>Source: Department for Transport 2008: Road Casualties Great Britain, Main Results 2007 (Definitions).</i>	

10. The setting of the targets was supported by considerable statistical and policy evaluation.¹⁷ The potential contributions to casualty reduction, beyond the existing trend lines, were calculated for a range of policy initiatives. These included additional measures to reduce drinking and driving, further work to improve secondary safety in vehicles,¹⁸ new road safety engineering schemes and safety on rural single-carriageways (which have a high rate of fatal accidents). Thus, the targets were not merely extrapolations of trends but ambitious statements of priority and intent.

11. Subsequently, in 2002, the road safety Public Service Agreement of the Department for Transport was enhanced to reflect the higher number of road casualties that occur in disadvantaged areas. It was agreed to achieve a higher level of reduction in disadvantaged areas – defined as the 88 Neighbourhood Renewal Fund areas.

12. Slightly different targets were set for Northern Ireland:¹⁹

- A reduction of one third in the number of people killed or seriously injured in road accidents; and
- A reduction of 50% in the number of children killed or seriously injured.

These were to be achieved in the period 2002–2012 and measured against the 1996–2000 average.

17 Broughton, J et al, *The Numerical context for setting national casualty reduction targets*. TRL Report 382, 2000, Table 6

18 Primary safety measures reduce the likelihood of a collision occurring; secondary safety measures prevent or reduce the severity of an injury in a collision.

19 Department of the Environment Northern Ireland, *Northern Ireland Road Safety Strategy 2002–2012*, 2002

13. The Government has continued to recognise improving road safety as one of its core transport objectives. Promoting safety, health and security is one of the five key objectives in *Towards a Sustainable Transport System*.²⁰ Whilst this document does not elaborate on how the strategy for sustainable transport links with the road safety strategy, the intent at least is clear.

14. Some organisations have commented positively on how the Government has moved away from dealing with road safety in isolation and is increasingly linking it to other key policy areas, such as social inclusion, young people, and improved health.²¹

15. We commend the Government on having set and maintained ambitious road traffic casualty reduction targets. We also commend it for recognising that road safety needs to be integrated with other important policy objectives such as promoting good health, reducing carbon-dioxide emissions, tackling deprivation and improving quality of life. The Government has not sought to reduce casualties by discouraging vulnerable road users from taking to the streets; but some trends, such as increased traffic, have had this effect. We recommend that in the forthcoming White Paper on sustainable transport, road safety objectives should be integrated with these wider objectives. We also recommend that the road safety strategy for beyond 2010 be explicitly set in the context of wider policy objectives. This should help to ensure that road safety is seen as relevant in other policy areas and that road safety policies do not have unintended consequences on other important objectives, such as improving public health by encouraging walking, cycling and play.

Progress since 2000

16. The Government is on track to meet all its road safety targets by 2010.²² By 2007:

- the number of people killed or seriously injured was 36 per cent below the 1994–98 average;
- the number of children killed or seriously injured was 55 per cent below the 1994–98 average;
- provisional estimates show the slight casualty rate was 30 per cent below the 1994–98 average; and
- the additional target for reducing casualties in areas of deprivation was met in 2005.²³

17. Not surprisingly, the Government has tended to report this as “good progress”.²⁴ In his evidence to us, the Minister, Jim Fitzpatrick MP, was more circumspect. He told us

20 Department for Transport, *Towards a Sustainable Transport System*, Cm 7226, October 2007

21 Ev 187

22 Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report*, September 2008, p 21

23 Department for Transport, *Second Review of the Government's Road Safety Strategy*, February 2007. Published jointly with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government.

24 Department for Transport, *Annual Report 2008*, Cm 7395, May 2008, p 125

In general terms, casualty reduction has been good but not good enough, particularly in terms of deaths. Our target was set in terms of the combined figure for deaths and serious injuries. The trend in these has diverged unexpectedly [...]²⁵

18. Those who have looked more closely at the figures have raised concerns. Two official reviews have been undertaken, in 2004²⁶ and 2007.²⁷ The more recent review noted:

- good overall progress against the targets but serious injuries falling much more rapidly than deaths;
- little progress in reducing car user deaths;
- a significant rise in motorcyclist deaths;
- particular concerns about male drivers, younger drivers and rural roads; and
- possible changes in the level of accident reporting to the police, based on comparison of hospital and police data.²⁸

19. A further report concluded that the casualty reductions anticipated in 2000 would not be achieved on current trends by 2010. Three policy measures had exceeded expectations: road safety engineering measures, improved secondary safety in cars and additional measures for speed reduction. However, in terms of casualty reductions from certain other major policy measures, little or no progress was likely to be achieved by the end of the target period due to a lack of initiatives.²⁹ These were notably:

- improving safety on rural single-carriageway roads;
- reducing casualties in drink-drive accidents; and
- reducing the accident involvement of novice drivers.

20. The road safety target for deprivation was met in 2005. However, significant disparities remain in casualty rates according to levels of income. Child pedestrians from the lowest socio-economic groups are 21 times more likely to be killed in a traffic accident than those from the top socio-economic group.³⁰ This inequality is not restricted to child pedestrians: less affluent car users are also at greater risk of death than the more affluent.³¹ Dr Christie felt that the target had not been sufficiently stretching and that, having achieved it, there

25 Q 356

26 Department for Transport, *Tomorrow's Roads – safer for everyone: The first three year review*, April 2004. Published jointly with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government.

27 Department for Transport, *Second Review of the Government's Road Safety Strategy*, February 2007. Published jointly with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government.

28 Ibid, para 60.

29 Broughton, J, *Monitoring Progress towards the 2010 casualty reduction target – 2005 data*. TRL Report 663, 2007 (Table A1)

30 Q 14 [Dr Christie]. See also Edwards, P., Roberts et al, "Deaths from injury in children and employment status in family: analysis of trends in class specific death rates", *British Medical Journal*, 333, pp 119–121.

31 Ward, H et al, *Fatal injuries to car occupants: analysis of health and population data*. Road Safety Research Report No 77, Department for Transport, February 2007, p 23

was a danger that the problems would be overlooked.³² **We urge the Government to renew its focus on tackling the appalling level of child road traffic deaths associated with deprivation.**

Reliability of data

21. The Government's assessment of "good progress" towards its main target (reducing the number of people killed or seriously injured by 40%) relies largely on the reduction in serious injuries, rather than deaths. There are approximately ten serious injuries reported for each death, so trends in serious injuries dominate the target. Whereas deaths have declined by 18% since the baseline, serious injuries have declined by more than twice as much (37%). This was not anticipated when the target was set.

22. The Government's monitoring data are based on police records of road accidents and casualties on a form known as "STATS19". The forms are collated by the local highway authorities and forwarded to the Department for Transport. It has long been known that not all accidents are recorded on the STATS19 system³³ and that some accident types, such as pedal cyclist accidents, are disproportionately under-recorded (see Box 2). It has been assumed, however, that these data would give a robust picture of the trends (if not the absolute numbers), just as a sample survey should do. This assumption, sometimes referred to as the "trend defence", rests on the underlying principle that, even if not all accidents are reported, the proportion which go unreported is likely to remain pretty constant. There is, however, increasing evidence that reporting and recording has changed over the period and that the STATS19 data do not give a reliable picture, particularly of the trends in serious injuries. Indeed, the trend defence is now challenged by some of the statisticians responsible for compiling the data.³⁴

Box 2: Sources of under-reporting and under-recording of road accidents

- Not all road accidents are "reportable": for example, if no injury occurs. The requirements to stop, provide information and report a road traffic accident are set out in the Road Traffic Act 1988 (section 170), as amended by the Road Traffic Act 1991 (Schedule 4);
- There is no legal obligation for drivers to report road accidents to the police, provided the parties concerned exchange personal details at the scene;³⁵
- Some accidents that should be reported by drivers to the police are not reported. This may be because the driver is ignorant of the legal requirements or is reluctant to do so, for example, if the driver has been drinking or is uninsured;
- The police do not record all accidents reported to them. Up to one fifth of casualties reported to the police are not recorded in the STATS19 system;³⁶ and
- It is often difficult for a police officer to judge whether a casualty should be classified as having a serious or slight injury (see Box 1). For example, the full severity of the injury may not be apparent until some time after the collision when the police officer is no longer present. Research has found that the police tend to underestimate the severity of the injury.³⁷

32 Qq 14–17

33 For example, Bull, J.P. and Roberts, B.J., "Road Accident Statistics—A Comparison of Police and Hospital Information", *Accident Analysis & Prevention*, 5, 1973, pp 45–53.

34 Ev 343

35 For further explanation, see Ward, H, Lyons, R and Thoreau, R, *Underreporting of casualties – Phase 1*, Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report 69, June 2006, p 15.

36 Department for Transport 2007: Road Casualties Great Britain 2006, p 1

37 Ward, H (2006), op.cit.

23. There are a number of reasons to believe that the actual decline in serious injuries is not as great as that recorded in STATS19 statistics:

- Hospital data suggest that serious injuries are not falling.³⁸ There are differences in the criteria and hospital data are not necessarily 'correct' but this divergence has been confirmed by a number of in-depth studies.³⁹ Personal injury insurance claims are rising⁴⁰ and collisions attended by the Fire and Rescue Service have not shown a decline.⁴¹
- Over long periods the ratio between deaths and serious injuries has been 11–13 serious injuries for each death. Yet since 2000 the ratio has declined almost every year, without explanation, so that now there are only 9 serious injuries reported for each death.⁴²
- Improvements in medical care can be expected to have saved the lives of some road accident victims who would previously have died. The number, however, is disputed. The College of Emergency Medicine says that advances in medical care have had a considerable impact in recent years⁴³ whilst the Minister told us that this has made little difference to the casualty figures.⁴⁴ Life-saving medical care would tend to reduce the figure for deaths but not for serious injuries.
- Witnesses representing the police pointed out that the police tended to report only those accidents that they attended and that a reduction in the number of roads police officers had led to a reduction in accident reporting.⁴⁵
- Analysis of serious injury records shows that it is the less severe 'serious injuries' which are declining more rapidly than the more severe 'serious injuries'.⁴⁶ These are also the types of injury less likely to be reported to the police.

24. We asked many of our witnesses why serious injuries appeared to have declined so rapidly whilst deaths had not. Mr David Lynam of the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) thought that there had been some changes in policy and in vehicle design that might explain a small increase in the chance of fatal outcomes but "that is explaining only a proportion of the difference we see."⁴⁷ No-one was able to offer a more convincing explanation, other than the possibility that reporting rates had changed. The Transport

38 Gill, M, Goldacre, MJ, Yeates, DGR, "Changes in safety on England's roads: analysis of hospital statistics", *British Medical Journal*, 23 June 2006

39 Ward, H, (2006), op.cit.

40 Q 63. This could be a result, at least in part, of changes to the law relating to personal injury and the introduction of conditional fee agreements.

41 Q 187 and Ev 349

42 Ev 272

43 Ev 346

44 Q 438; Ward et al.; *Fatal injuries to car occupants: Analysis of health and population data*, Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report no 77, 2007

45 Qq 167–168 [Mrs Jan Berry of the Police Federation and Chief Constable Steve Green of ACPO]

46 Ward, H, Lyons, R and Thoreau, R, *Underreporting of casualties – Phase 1*, Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report 69, June 2006

47 Qq 22–26 [Mr Lynam]

Research Laboratory investigated possible explanations, particularly seat-belt wearing rates and an increase in 'unsurvivable' accident types, but found that these did not explain the divergence.⁴⁸ An analysis of Scottish casualty data found that, relative to hospital records, police reporting rates fell substantially between 1997 and 2005.⁴⁹

25. The Department for Transport has acknowledged weaknesses in the police data and publishes caveats with the relevant statistics. For example:

“[...] research has shown that an appreciable proportion of non-fatal injury accidents are not reported to the police. [...] up to a fifth of casualties reported to the police are not included in the statistical return. Moreover, studies also show that the police tend to underestimate severity of injury because of the difficulty in distinguishing severity at the scene of the accident.”⁵⁰

26. Differences between police and hospital records are not peculiar to road-traffic casualties: there is a similar discrepancy in the recorded numbers of injuries due to violence.⁵¹ The Department has commissioned research to further compare police and hospital casualty data. This shows a decline in the rate of reporting of serious injuries.⁵²

27. The reporting of accidents involving only slight injuries has always been acknowledged to be less robust than that for more serious injuries. Furthermore, the reporting of slight injuries also appears to have declined.⁵³ Although slight injuries are still an important issue, particularly for vulnerable road users,⁵⁴ our witnesses generally attached little credence to the slight injury target.

28. The Department for Transport seems reluctant to contemplate that all these findings might imply some fundamental problems. “We do not see it as a major problem, but there is a discrepancy. [...] We are very happy with the STATS19 figures we get from the police and have no reason to doubt that they are not in about the right place [...]”⁵⁵

29. Up to this point we have accepted the assurances of the Government that its casualty data were robust and that good progress was being made on bringing down the number of people killed or seriously injured. Given the significant yet unexplained divergence in the trends for deaths and serious injuries, and given the growing body of evidence of changes in the reporting rates, we can no longer conclude that good progress is being made on casualty reduction. Indeed, we are worried that Ministers are not challenging their officials sufficiently and that policy-makers and practitioners are being lulled into a false sense of security.

48 Broughton, J. and Walter, L, *Trends in fatal car accidents*. TRL Report PPR172, 2007

49 Broughton, J et al, *SafetyNet. Building the European Safety Observatory. Final Report on Task 15*, 2007, p 37

50 Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report*, September 2008, p 1

51 Q 24

52 Ward, H (2006), op.cit.

53 Q 22

54 Ev 179, 184

55 Q 400

30. The reality is that STATS19 is a system for recording accidents reported to the police, in order to assist with road safety measures. It is well established that some common categories of injury-accident are disproportionately under-recorded. It was never designed to be a scientific method for recording overall trends in accidents or casualties. It is neither a census of all accidents, nor a properly structured sample.

31. The Government should establish a British Road Safety Survey to track overall casualty and safety trends. This would be a structured survey, gathered from a statistically significant sample of households, similar to the National Travel Survey. It would, therefore, not rely on levels of reporting by road users or police. It would be akin to the British Crime Survey which is seen as a more reliable long-term monitor of crime than the police crime statistics. This would involve original survey work, and might also draw on existing data sources, including police, hospital and insurance company data, to obtain a more rounded picture. A survey would have the additional benefit of being able to monitor attitudes to road safety including, for example, the fears of vulnerable road-users.

32. Chief Constable Steve Green of the Association of Chief Police Officers emphasised that the police were not deliberately misreporting or under-recording road casualty data.

One thing I would say absolutely categorically is there is no organised conspiracy to under-record. There is no incentive to do so because there is no result at the end of it, partly because so little priority is given to road safety in the Home Office list of priorities.⁵⁶

33. Other witnesses emphasised the value and quality of STATS19 data for a range of practical purposes.⁵⁷ We make no criticism of the police with regard to STATS19 reporting. The police have no mandate to seek out unreported accidents, nor the time or qualifications to make complex assessments of the severity of injuries. Equally, we accept that STATS19 data provides some valuable information.

34. There is a significant body of evidence to suggest that the current methods for recording road-traffic injuries are flawed. We recommend that the Government commissions an independent review of the STATS19 system in order to establish its strengths and weaknesses, bearing in mind our recommendation above for a British Road Safety Survey. The review should also examine ways in which the system could be simplified, with a view to promoting greater consistency, and consider ways of routinely linking police and hospital data.

Reductions in road deaths

35. Whereas we have reservations about the accuracy of the serious injury data, there seems to be agreement that few, if any, deaths go unrecorded. These give a less controversial account of the Government's success with reducing casualties. The reviews of 2004 and 2007 noted the disappointing progress in reducing deaths.

56 Q 168 [Mr Green]

57 Ev 297

36. The casualty figures for Great Britain for 2007 were significantly different to previous years in that the number of deaths fell sharply. Compared with 2006:

- overall deaths fell by 7%, contrasting with only 11% in the previous ten years;
- the number of child deaths fell by 28% to its lowest ever total; and
- deaths among car users declined by 11%.

The 2007 figures are extremely welcome.

37. The Minister was understandably wary about placing too much emphasis on a single year and there has not been time for the data to be fully analysed to see if there are particular reasons for them.⁵⁸ It remains to be seen whether this represents the result of particular events, a random fluctuation, or the start of a new trend.⁵⁹

38. The changes in deaths over the whole period, compared to the 1994–98 average, are shown in Table 1. This shows that 632 fewer people (18%) died on the roads in 2007.

Table 1: Change in deaths by road user group, 1994–98 average to 2007

Road user group	1994–98 Average	2007	Change (%)
Pedestrians	1008	646	-362 (-36%)
Cyclists	186	136	-50 (-27%)
Motorcyclists	467	588	+121 (+26%)
Car users	1762	1432	-330 (-19%)
Bus & Coach	20	12	-8 (-40%)
LGV & HGV	118	110	-8 (-7%)
All users	3578	2946	-632 (-18%)

Source: Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report, September 2008*.

39. Excluding bus and coach users where the numbers are very small, the biggest absolute and percentage fall is in pedestrian deaths, which have declined steadily, by 36% over the period. Cyclist deaths have also declined substantially, by 27%. The distances walked and cycled per person have stayed fairly constant over the period but total distances travelled by these modes have increased due to growth in the population.⁶⁰ The percentage reductions in child pedestrian and cyclist deaths are even greater (Table 2). There is, however, some evidence that part of the reduction is due to increased restrictions on the independent

58 Qq 413–415

59 Road deaths have also declined sharply in the USA in 2007/08. This has been attributed to a reduction in risky driving behaviour and less driving by those with higher accident rates, as a result of increased fuel prices. See Sivak, M, *Is the U.S. on the path to the lowest motor vehicle fatalities in a decade?* UMTRI– 2008– 39, Michigan University, July 2008.

60 Ev 105

mobility of younger children,⁶¹ something that the National Travel Survey is not designed to monitor.

40. Car user deaths, particularly car drivers, had reduced by only 9% prior to 2007. As this is the largest fatality group, it is particularly worrying. In 2007 there was a sharp fall giving a 19% reduction over the whole period.

41. The figure that most stands out is the 26% *increase* in motorcyclist deaths. The amount of motorcycling has increased over the period but so too have the amounts of driving, walking and cycling whilst the numbers of deaths for these groups has reduced.

42. Accidents involving young drivers, particularly young males, are also a major concern. We have previously drawn attention to it in our Report Novice Drivers which showed that:

- 27% of 17–19 year-old males are involved in a road collision as a driver in their first year of driving; and
- one in eight driving licence holders is aged under 25, yet one in three drivers who die in a collision is under 25, and almost one in two drivers killed at night is under 25.

Despite the improvements in 2007, drivers aged between 16 and 29 years still make up 42% of all driver deaths. We highlight this issue again in paragraphs 67–77 below.

Table 2: Change in child deaths, 1994–98 average to 2007

Road user group	1994–98 Average	2007	Change (%)
Pedestrians	133	57	-76 (-57%)
Cyclists	43	13	-30 (-70%)
Car users	77	45	-32 (-42%)
Others	82	51	-31 (-38%)
All users	260	121	-139 (-53%)

Source: Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report, September 2008*.

43. Safety – as opposed to the mere absence of accidents – can be measured by casualty rates based on distance travelled. The fatality rates for different users are shown in Table 3 below. These show that over the period 1997–2006 the fatality rate has fallen for each of the main user groups, but more steeply for pedestrians and pedal cyclists.

61 Q 337 [Mr Voce]; also Cycling England, *Cul-de-sac kids* survey, March 2008

Table 3: Deaths per billion passenger kilometres

Road user group	1997	2006
Pedestrians	57	36
Cyclists	45	31
Motorcyclists	119	107
Car users	3	2.5

Source: *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007, Table 52*

International comparisons

44. Compared to many other countries, the UK has a low number of road deaths relative to its population. Its position, however, has been slipping. In 2001 it was second behind Malta in a table of 29 nations compiled by the European Transport Safety Council. By 2006 it was down to sixth, behind Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Norway.⁶² Of the top ten nations, all had made bigger percentage reductions in deaths than the UK.⁶³

45. Mr Fred Wegman, Managing Director of the Netherlands road safety institute SWOV, told us that

“Until 2000 we were always looking to the United Kingdom when it came to road safety. You were the inventors of many good activities and policies. All of a sudden, somewhere in 2000, you stopped doing things and we [the Netherlands] continued with our efforts.”

46. His view is echoed by others with an international perspective.⁶⁴ Many of our witnesses suggested that the UK could learn most about road safety from the examples of the Netherlands and Sweden, and in different ways, France and Germany.⁶⁵

47. Along with the evidence provided by our witnesses, we have used the above tables on road deaths to identify priorities for the future. We set these out below.

62 Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report*, September 2008, Table 51

63 *Local Transport Today*, op.cit.

64 Ev 333

65 Ev 294

3 Priorities beyond 2010

Systems approach

48. Those countries that have adopted the most ambitious visions for road safety have also adopted a systems approach. Rather than tackling one-off problems, the systems approach takes a more fundamental and integrated approach to designing out the possibility of deaths and serious injury. The vehicle, the road infrastructure, regulations and driver training are designed to similar safety and performance standards. For example, the speed at which airbags are operational should be compatible with the maximum speed of the vehicle.

49. This approach is almost routine in other transport modes.⁶⁶ It has been described by safety expert James Reason as the ‘Swiss cheese’ approach whereby it is made almost impossible for an event to pass directly through the holes in the system and emerge as a serious accident, due to the multiple safety barriers designed to block it. This is more than just “taking a holistic approach”.⁶⁷

50. The UK has tended to take a pragmatic, problem-solving approach to road safety, such as treating sites with accident clusters. This has had good results, but as these sites diminish, more difficult, diffuse problems remain. These require a different approach.

51. The systems approach to road safety, now adopted by the Netherlands, Sweden and elsewhere is different to that pursued by the UK. We believe that it is time for the UK to move towards this more fundamental approach which is accepted for other transport modes. The Department for Transport needs to explore this approach further and to engage the public in a discussion of the ideas and implications.

Roads

52. The UK’s roads are some of the busiest in Europe.⁶⁸ Part of the difficulty of reducing casualties and improving the safety of places where people live and work is due to the density of our population and the historic road network that brings heavy traffic into close proximity with pedestrians, cyclists and other vulnerable road users. Many city streets and rural roads are simply not designed for the volumes of traffic they now carry.⁶⁹

53. The Eddington study showed the benefit of roads investment to the economy.⁷⁰ Some aspects of the UK’s performance on road safety are weak due to inadequate investment in transport infrastructure. More investment is needed in the road network to take unsuitable traffic out of residential areas and to reduce the serious casualty toll on some rural roads.

66 Ev 153

67 Q 411

68 Q 223

69 Ev 143

70 Department for Transport *The Eddington Transport Study*, December 2006

However, diverting road safety budgets to new road building would not be the most cost-effective way of reducing casualties.

54. Local highway authorities have been effective at treating locations where accidents have clustered. Because of their success there are now fewer treatable sites, and those that remain often require more costly treatment to save a smaller number of accidents. More systematic approaches to improving the safety of our road infrastructure are needed to reduce the possibility of death or injury occurring.

55. Whilst some casualties are the result of deliberate recklessness or rule-breaking by road users, many are the result of momentary lapses of concentration or a coincidence of events:

We can no longer say in the future that we are just looking for violators. Half, if not more, of our problem is related to people like you and me having a crash. [...] That is why we are in favour of something like a “forgiving road” – forgiving of your errors.⁷¹

56. A disproportionate percentage of collisions and fatal or severe injuries occur on rural roads. Progress with tackling these accidents has been disappointing.⁷² The Road Safety Foundation claims that investing in the ‘forgiving’ engineering measures would yield first-year rates of return of 300%.⁷³ The Minister has expressed guarded support.⁷⁴ There are issues to resolve, such as the visual impact on the environment, and the capacity of the road safety engineering profession to deliver these schemes. There may also be questions about the priorities: should money be spent on protecting road users from their own mistakes, such as drivers colliding with road-side objects; or should it be spent on protecting road users (particularly vulnerable road users) from risks imposed by other road users?

57. The emphasis needs to shift from treating localised problems to one of long-term improvements to the safety of the infrastructure. At the same time, it is essential that a multi-disciplinary approach is taken to ensure that safety measures are compatible with a good quality local environment.

58. The safety benefits of lower speeds—20 mph or below in residential areas, town centres and around schools—have long been recognised by the Department for Transport. Progress has been made with tackling inappropriate speed and many areas have been traffic calmed, with 30 mph or 20 mph limits. Yet this has been a slow and expensive process and, although effective in engineering terms, they have rarely enhanced the attractiveness of our streets in the way that schemes in other countries have done.⁷⁵ Britain has lacked boldness and the pace of change has also been slow. The German state of North Rhine-Westphalia introduced 10,000 home-zones by 1991 and Graz (Austria) made the whole city 20 mph in 1992.⁷⁶ These things have been achieved in only a handful of UK

71 Q 224 [Mr Wegman]

72 Department for Transport, *Second Review of the Government's Road Safety Strategy*, February 2007. Published jointly with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government.

73 Mr J Dawson, Chairman of the Campaign for Safer Road Design at the campaign launch, House of Lords, 8 July 2008.

74 Jim Fitzpatrick MP: Speech at the launch of the Road Safety Foundation's Campaign for Safer Road Design, House of Lords, 8 July 2008.

75 Ev 179

76 Q 205 [Professor Whitelegg]

towns and cities, such as Hull and Portsmouth. The charity Sustrans has pioneered “Do it Yourself Streets”⁷⁷ which, according to Mr Voce, have proved effective for a fraction of the cost of conventional home zones.⁷⁸ However, these are isolated initiatives.

59. Much wider use of 20-mph limits is supported by groups representing vulnerable user and by many other organisations who presented evidence to our inquiry. The Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS) recommends 20 mph as the default speed limit in all built-up areas.⁷⁹

60. Ways must be found to satisfy the desires of local communities for safer streets. We recommend that local authorities be given the powers and resources to introduce 20-mph limits much more widely. Flexibility is required to avoid the prohibitive costs associated with some approaches. The balance of engineering measures, technology, policing and community influence should be a local matter. Systems, however, must not rely on high levels of fines or draconian enforcement.

Vehicles

61. The driving environment is likely to be very different in ten years’ time. Climate change policies, higher oil prices, an ageing and increasing population, security considerations, and many other factors may become increasingly influential.

62. Future vehicles are likely to incorporate many new technologies, possibly including intelligent speed limiters, automatic crash avoidance, and even driverless cars.⁸⁰ We considered some of these in our Report *Cars of the future*.⁸¹ Some vehicles are already fitted with systems such as electronic vehicle stabilisation, data-recorders and pre-ignition breath tests (‘alcolocks’). These and other technologies could play a significant role in reducing casualties.⁸²

63. Most of the new technologies are market-driven. Motor manufacturers and technology specialists are understandably keen to promote them, not least because they can give new cars a commercial advantage. The motor industry is frustrated that technologies that might save lives are not more readily adopted because of additional costs to the driver.⁸³

64. Professor Oliver Carsten of Leeds University points out that independent evaluation of these technologies, often carried out at EU level, has sometimes been “remarkably thin” and that “reliance on the vehicle manufacturers to promote new systems may not lead to the most beneficial deployment path in safety terms”.⁸⁴ We welcome the publication by the

77 www.sustrans.org.uk/diystreets

78 Q 317 [Mr Voce]

79 PACTS, *Beyond 2010 – a holistic approach to road safety in Great Britain*, 2007, p33. The Director of PACTS, Robert Gifford, is a Specialist Adviser to this Committee and has contributed to its work on this inquiry.

80 Ev 278, 312

81 Transport Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2003–04, *Cars of the Future*, HC 319, 8 November 2004

82 Ev 143

83 Ev 312

84 Ev 243

Department of the research into intelligent speed adaptation (ISA).⁸⁵ However, we are disappointed that the Government is reluctant to take a lead on this issue by, for example, requiring the fitting of ISA in its own vehicle fleet. While consumer pressure is important, the suggestion that a significant safety feature can be left to the market leaves open the conclusion that the Government is not taking safety seriously.

65. The safety benefits of new technologies do not always materialise in practice as road users may not respond to them as hoped. Initial research into the implementation of anti-lock braking found that cars with ABS continued to be involved in as many accidents as those without. However, that position improved as the technology became more prevalent within the car fleet.

66. The Government should take a more proactive approach to determining the safety benefits of new vehicle technologies. It should make clear which ones it believes have most safety benefits and encourage their adoption into the UK vehicle fleet. The Government should use the various tools at its disposal, including fiscal and financial incentives, to encourage employers to use vehicles with additional proven safety features. Government departments and agencies should also give a lead in their fleet purchasing decisions. This would help to reduce work-related casualties and speed up the adoption of these features into the wider UK vehicle fleet.

Young drivers

67. The continuing challenge of young drivers is clear. In 2005, there were 1,077 road deaths in crashes involving a driver aged between 17 and 25. Of the dead, 377 were drivers in that age group. Young drivers, especially those under 20 years of age, are nearly 12 times more likely than those aged 35–65 to have caused a fatal accident than to have been innocently involved in one.⁸⁶

68. Young men are disproportionately more involved in the most serious traffic offences. In 2004, of 384 findings of guilt for causing death or bodily harm, 25% were male drivers under the age of 21. 33% of those found guilty of dangerous driving were males under 21.⁸⁷

69. The safety of young and novice drivers is of great concern to us and others.⁸⁸ It was the subject of an earlier report by the Committee⁸⁹ and of two Westminster Hall⁹⁰ debates this year. The Government has responded with its consultation document, *Learning to Drive*.⁹¹ This proposes additional steps prior to fully qualifying as a driver but does not accept any of the restrictions on young drivers, such as a ban on carrying passengers that we

85 Carsten, O et al, *Intelligent Speed Adaptation*, Department for Transport, 15 September 2008

86 Department for Transport, *Second Review of the Government's Road Safety Strategy*, February 2007. Published jointly with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government, p18–19

87 Department for Transport, *Tomorrow's Roads – safer for everyone: The first three year review*, April 2004. Published jointly with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government.

88 Ev 156

89 Transport Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2006–07, *Novice Drivers*, HC 355, 11 July 2007

90 On 7 February 2008 and 16 July 2008.

91 Department for Transport, *Learning to Drive – a consultation paper*, 7 May 2008

recommended in our Report on *Novice Drivers*.⁹² It is unlikely that any changes proposed in *Learning to Drive* could be adopted before 2011. When and by how much this might lead to a reduction in young drivers involved in serious accidents is uncertain.⁹³ The proposals place a great deal of faith in improved training overcoming what some witnesses see as genetically-programmed “caveman tendencies” in young men.⁹⁴

70. The links between deprivation, acquiring a licence, affording vehicle insurance, and unsafe driving came through strongly in the evidence that we heard.⁹⁵ This is a complex area, much of it outside the remit of the Department for Transport. The Fire and Rescue Service, for example, plays an increasing role in road safety for young people who are not in education or training.⁹⁶ Our witnesses were clear that this was a vital area to tackle, through a multi-agency approach, from both the road safety perspective and that of tackling wider social issues.⁹⁷ This might include organisations such as the Road Haulage Association which suggests that lorry drivers could provide positive role models.⁹⁸

71. There are clear links between uninsured and unlicensed driving, and crash involvement. A twin-track approach is needed. The Government should encourage greater partnership working at local level to prevent offending by young people. At the same time, greater levels of enforcement are needed to prevent uninsured and unlicensed driving. The Committee recommends the Department for Transport identify projects of this type that have been successful and disseminate these more widely.

72. We do not wish to stigmatise young drivers. The dice are often loaded against them: not only are they less experienced but they also tend to drive older, smaller and less well-protected vehicles.⁹⁹ They drive more at night and with passengers who may distract them. The fact remains, however, that young drivers – particularly young male drivers – represent a disproportionate risk to road users, including themselves and those travelling with them.

73. Whilst we welcome the Government’s move to raise driving standards we have some concerns. Firstly, the proposals do not address the urgency or gravity of the situation. The

92 The Report recommended that the Government:

- evaluate the enforceability of two blood alcohol concentration limits: one for novice drivers, one for the general driving population; (Paragraph 109)
- reduce the permitted blood alcohol concentration from 0.8g/l to zero (or 0.2g/l) for novice drivers; and tackle drink-driving through ongoing publicity and enforcement campaigns targeted at all drivers; (Paragraph 110)
- prohibit novice drivers from carrying any passengers aged 10–20 years, between the hours of 11 p.m. and 5 a.m.; (Paragraph 113)
- undertake research on what combination of restrictions in a graduated driver licensing system would be most effective in reducing road death and injury among novice drivers, but not delay implementation. (Paragraph 115)

93 Q 385

94 Ev 283

95 Q 43 [Dr Christie]

96 Q 175 [Mr Smith]

97 Q 104 [Ms Ward]

98 Ev 256

99 Q 88

scale of casualty reduction that *Learning to drive* will achieve is unclear and benefits will be long-term at best. The proposals are most unlikely to have an immediate impact in the way that restrictions on carrying passengers would do. Secondly, despite the Minister's assurances, we believe there is a risk that the cost of acquiring a driving licence will rise and thereby exclude significant numbers of people, thereby reducing social inclusion and encouraging unlicensed driving.¹⁰⁰

74. We are also unconvinced by the Government's contention that, under the proposed scheme, newly-qualified drivers will be as competent as experienced drivers. We believe there will inevitably be a post-qualification period in which further valuable experience is gained and that some restrictions on newly-qualified drivers are both justified and reasonable. These would reflect not only the driver's reduced experience but also the higher levels of risk, responsibility and distraction that young drivers often face.

75. We support the Government's efforts to revise the driver training system and to place greater emphasis on attitudes and behaviours as well as driving skills. The proposals in Learning to Drive are steps in the right direction, but we are not confident that they will be sufficient to arrest the carnage of young drivers on our roads. We recommend that the Government takes bolder and more urgent steps to cut the number of collisions involving young drivers, particularly young men. We urge that it reconsiders its response to our recommendations in *Novice Drivers* regarding a graduated licensing scheme and, in particular (p36), restrictions on young drivers carrying teenage passengers between the hours of 11pm and 5am.

76. Some councils see pedestrian and cycle training as a valuable precursor to learning to drive. Nottingham City Council is preparing to pilot LifeCycle – a structured cycle training programme for children from the age of five until they become competent to take part in Cycling England's Bikeability courses. The council anticipates that early and then staged interventions are likely to produce a more risk averse, disciplined future adult vehicle user.¹⁰¹

77. More link-up is needed between the various road safety education programmes. It is disappointing that, in a relatively wide-ranging review of driver training, the Government has not consulted on the possibility of strengthening links between driver training, and pedestrian and cyclist training in the ways that some local authorities are doing. We recommend that the Department for Transport and the Department for Children, Schools and Families consider ways in which a range of road-user training schemes might be targeted at school students of the appropriate ages.

Vulnerable road users

Motorcyclists

78. The substantial rise in the number of motorcyclist deaths stands out in stark contrast to the reduction in deaths for all other road user groups. On current trends motorcyclist

100 Qq 421–423

101 Ev 326

deaths will soon exceed pedestrian deaths. The casualty rate for motorcyclists (in terms of deaths per 100,000 kilometres travelled) is over 40 times that for car users (Table 3).

79. The Motorcycle Action Group (MAG) told us that other European countries, which have higher rates of motorcycle use, have lower motorcycle collision rates because drivers are more aware of motorcyclists. MAG believes that up to the mid-1990s motorcyclists were given no official consideration but progress is now being made “[...] with the Government’s Motorcycling Strategy and with more local authorities beginning to think seriously about motorcycling [but] we are way behind the game.”¹⁰² The Government has set up a national advisory committee and is working with a range of interests to ensure that motorcycling is seen as a central part of road safety policy.¹⁰³

80. We have previously drawn attention to the dreadful motorcyclist casualty rate and we have called for radical action.¹⁰⁴ The various parties now recognise the issue and seem to be working together on the problem. However, the statistics show how much remains to be done.

81. We recommend that the Government redoubles its efforts to improve the safety of motorcyclists and to ensure that their safety is seen as central to its road safety strategy. This needs to be communicated effectively to all parties involved with road safety.

82. The causes of motorcyclist accidents and remedial measures need to be thoroughly investigated and the results communicated to road safety professionals, motorcyclists and other road users.

Child pedestrians and cyclists

83. The view of many of our witnesses was that the UK’s record on the safety of child pedestrians and cyclists was disappointing.¹⁰⁵ This is confirmed by the Government’s own assessment.¹⁰⁶ The significant reductions in child deaths, particularly in the past few years, show encouraging progress, although some of this appears to be due to increased restrictions on children’s mobility, which might in turn have negative consequences such as increased child obesity.

84. It is also clear that cosseting children from traffic and depriving them of the opportunity to learn about risks and road skills is not a sensible or responsible approach. In many cases, this merely defers the danger to later in the child’s life. Mr Armstrong of Living Streets highlighted how the incidence of serious accidents suffered by children doubles between the ages of 10 and 11 years. Living Streets believes this to be because many primary school children are driven to school but then travel independently to secondary school, without having had the opportunity to develop adequate road safety skills.¹⁰⁷ There

102 Q 244 [Mr Brown]

103 Q 435

104 Transport Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2006–07, *The Government’s Motorcycling Strategy*, HC 264, 29 March 2007

105 Q 10

106 Department for Transport, *DfT Child Road Safety Strategy*, February 2007, paras 53–55

107 Q 315 [Mr Armstrong]

are other good reasons why children need independent mobility and physical activity, including preventing obesity and developing as confident, independent young people. The Government has recognised this in its Fair Play strategy launched in April 2008.¹⁰⁸

85. The fatality rates for child pedestrians and child cyclists in 24 countries are shown in Table 4. As the amount of cycling varies considerably across countries, the combined pedestrian-cyclist fatality rate probably best describes the safety of child road-users. Great Britain is ranked 9th and the UK is 11th. The safety of children in Northern Ireland is particularly poor, with only the Republic of Korea (South Korea) having a worse death rate.

86. We have noted earlier the strong links between deprivation and child casualties. Dr Christie was clear that the most important measures needed in poorer areas were improvements to the local environment to calm traffic and to create safer places for children to play. Involving the local community and strengthening neighbourhood policing are also important.¹⁰⁹

87. It is important to distinguish between casualty reduction and danger reduction: the absence of death or injury does not necessarily imply a safe environment. Professor Whitelegg of Liverpool John Moores University was critical of dangers faced by vulnerable road users in the UK, particularly child pedestrians and cyclists. Other European countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, have gone much further than the UK in adapting their urban areas for safer walking and cycling. Dutch children spend around half their pedestrian time in traffic-calmed streets compared with only 10% in England.¹¹⁰ Mr Sinclair of Help the Aged said that both older as well as young people benefited from safe, well designed communities.¹¹¹

108 *The Guardian*, "Risky play prepare kids for life", 6 August 2008

109 Qq 17–20

110 Ev 175

111 Q 315 [Mr Sinclair]

Table 4: International child fatality rates 2005

Country <i>Ranked by combined fatality rate</i>	Deaths per 100,000 population		
	Pedestrians aged 0–14	Cyclists aged 0–14	Combined
Iceland	0.00	0.00	0.00
Norway	0.11	0.00	0.11
Sweden	0.19	0.06	0.25
Canada	0.37	0.04	0.40
France	0.35	0.11	0.46
Switzerland	0.33	0.25	0.58
Denmark	0.29	0.29	0.59
Spain	0.43	0.19	0.61
Great Britain	0.54	0.14	0.68
New Zealand	0.57	0.11	0.68
Germany	0.35	0.34	0.70
United Kingdom	0.56	0.17	0.72
Japan	0.46	0.30	0.75
Netherlands	0.27	0.50	0.76
United States of America	0.56	0.21	0.77
Republic of Ireland	0.93	0.00	0.93
Portugal	0.61	0.36	0.97
Austria	0.76	0.23	0.99
Greece	0.69	0.31	1.00
Belgium	0.50	0.56	1.06
Slovenia	0.71	0.35	1.06
Czech Republic	0.79	0.33	1.11
Finland	0.77	0.66	1.42
Poland	1.10	0.40	1.50
Northern Ireland	1.13	0.85	1.97
Republic of Korea	2.10	0.23	2.33

Source: Department for Transport 2008 (requested by the Committee)

88. The UK is unusual in not having compulsory road safety education in schools.¹¹² The Department for Transport has been supporting the development of ‘Kerbcraft’ pedestrian training and, more recently, ‘Bikeability’ cycle training. Both these initiatives are welcome, though long overdue. The amount of formal pedestrian or cyclist training is increasing although there seems to be a lack of awareness about the extent to which they are being delivered.¹¹³ We recognise the important role that parents play in training their children to be safe road users but this needs to be supported with more formal training.

89. It is unsatisfactory that so few children are given pedestrian or cycle training at school. Whereas there is a plethora of statistics on school-related matters, the

112 Christie, N et al *Children’s road traffic safety: an international survey of policy and practice*. Road Research Report No.47. Department for Transport, 2004

113 Q 194; Q 389

percentage of children receiving road safety training is not monitored. We welcome the Department for Transport's support for Kerbcraft and, more recently, for Bikeability training. However, the Government should frame its targets in terms of the percentage, rather than the absolute number, of children in the target age group to be trained. The timescales for implementing these schemes must be reduced; and they should be properly monitored and supported with long-term resources to ensure that they are available to all children. We recommend that the Government investigates the effects that the compulsory wearing of cycle helmets by children would have on casualties.

90. Many organisations are involved with various forms of road safety, publicity, education and training for young people. These include the Red Cross,¹¹⁴ Fire and Rescue Service, Police and local authority road safety officers. The variety of organisations and approaches is a strength but it is not clear that these efforts are coordinated to best effect.

91. We note that there is a wealth of educational materials aimed at pre-school and primary age youngsters. However, we are concerned that similar efforts have not been made to produce material for pupils in secondary school. We believe that there needs to be a more co-ordinated approach to the provision of such materials and a consolidated approach to risk education across the age range.

Other vulnerable road users

92. The daily lives of many vulnerable road users are affected by safety issues that do not appear in the mainstream road safety statistics. These may not involve dramatic collisions but they can still lead to injury and even death.

93. According to a survey by Help the Aged, some 2.5 million people aged over 65 have fallen on damaged or uneven pavements in 2007. Of those, one third had to visit a hospital as a result, at a cost of around £1 billion to the NHS.¹¹⁵ Poor quality pavements are also particularly hazardous to visually-impaired pedestrians.¹¹⁶ Poor road surfaces are estimated to cause 7% of cyclist casualties.¹¹⁷ These appear in hospital casualty statistics but only rarely in the STATS19 data. The CSS highlighted "increasing concern amongst local highway authorities about the level of funding for road maintenance, not just for ensuring the structural integrity of the network, but to maintain safety standards."¹¹⁸

94. The British Horse Society is also concerned that the extent of collisions involving horses and vehicles is not reflected in the STATS19 statistics. The Society estimates that at least 3,000 road accidents every year involve horses but only those in which a person is injured are recorded, regardless of the injury to the horse. It is seeking better monitoring in official statistics and greater awareness by drivers of horses.¹¹⁹

114 Ev 122

115 Q 321

116 Ev 203

117 Information provided by CTC based on survey of 923 cyclists, October 2008.

118 Ev 324

119 Ev 196

95. Elsewhere in this Report, we have identified the apparent mismatch between data sets in terms of the number of actual casualties compared with those recorded. We believe that it is important for local highway authorities to have as accurate a picture as possible of the number of people killed or injured in their area and of the costs of preventing these injuries. We encourage these authorities to gather and publish such information in addition to the STATS19 data.

96. As cycling increases, there are concerns about the behaviour of some cyclists, particularly adults, who evidently have not received adequate cycle training, if any. They pose a risk to themselves and sometimes to others. **We recommend that cycle training should be offered as an alternative to fines for offending cyclists, just as driver retraining courses are now commonly offered to motorists who commit minor traffic offences.**

Older drivers

97. There are now more older drivers, who are driving further. Between 1995 and 2005, people aged over 70 increased the average distance that they drove by 65%. Many organisations who provided evidence stated that older drivers should be a priority for a future road safety strategy.

98. PACTS describes the issues as follows:

The implications of these travel patterns for road safety in an ageing population are profound. Although there is little evidence of an increase in the incidence of road traffic accidents, older people are more fragile than their younger counterparts – they injure more easily, their injuries are more severe and heal less quickly. Compared with drivers aged 20–50 years, older people’s fragility increases their risk of fatal injury by 1.75 times for drivers aged 60+, by 2.6 times at 70 and by over 5 times for drivers aged 80 and above.

People aged 60+ account for:

- 10% of all casualties, but 21% of deaths;
- 13% of pedestrian casualties, but 40% of pedestrian deaths; and
- 10% of all driver casualties and 20% of driver deaths.¹²⁰

99. There was a consensus among witnesses that mobility was extremely important to older people and should not be curtailed without good cause. There was also consensus that compulsory retesting or other age-related measures were not justified and might well be illegal on age discrimination grounds. Issues regarding efficacy of the self-reporting system and the responsibility of doctors to report patients who are unfit to drive were raised but these are not age-related.

120 PACTS, op.cit., p 44

100. Mr Wegman recommended that driving and the road environment should be made simpler and more ‘forgiving’, rather than general restrictions on the rights to drive for older drivers.¹²¹

101. We recognise the vulnerability of older drivers and their increasing numbers. We do not believe that automatic, mandatory retesting of drivers above a certain age is justified. We favour the more positive approach of simplifying the driving task and protecting drivers from the more serious consequences of their errors. Making walking and public transport more attractive to older people, with initiatives such as 20-mph limits and accessible vehicles, should also be encouraged. Schemes to provide assistance to older drivers are also to be encouraged.

Mobility scooters

102. Mobility scooters (defined in law as “invalid carriages”) are becoming increasingly common. Depending on its class, a mobility scooter may be used on pavements at up to 4 mph or on the road at up to 8 mph. There is no legal requirement to undertake training or to pass a test before using one.¹²²

103. Various issues have arisen about their interaction with pedestrians and other road users. ROSPA has received calls from people concerned about being nearly knocked down by mobility scooters.¹²³ Bus drivers have reported being delayed by mobility scooters in bus lanes.¹²⁴ The press have also highlighted incidents.¹²⁵ However, Mr Sinclair of Help the Aged said that it was an issue that scarcely arose and he thought it was largely a creation of the media. There was general agreement that reliable statistics were sparse. The Minister said that it was not an issue that crossed his desk and the view of the Government is that such statistics that do exist do not indicate a safety problem.¹²⁶

104. We recommend that the Government urgently review the increasing use and safety of mobility scooters with a view to establishing whether safety guidelines or mandatory training would be beneficial.

Driving at work

105. The number of work-related road deaths is estimated at between one quarter and one third of all road deaths. (This excludes commuter deaths, on the journey to or from work.) On this basis, in 2007, approximately 750–1,000 road deaths were work-related. By comparison, the Health and Safety Executive reported that there were 228 fatal injuries to

121 Q 228 [Mr Wegman]

122 Ev 80

123 Q 196

124 Q 300 [Mr Sealey]

125 *The Guardian* “Mobility scooter rider caught on 70mph dual carriageway”, 6 August 2008; In August 2008 mobility scooters were banned from the Tyne and Wear Metro after two serious accidents.

126 Q 377

workers in 2007–08 in “traditional” workplaces.¹²⁷ It is clear that, for many people, the greatest risk of being involved in a fatal accident at work is when they are using the roads.

106. The reluctance of the Government and the Health and Safety Commission to involve the Health and Safety Executive more fully in road safety had been criticised previously.¹²⁸ Although some progress has been made, ROSPA, PACTS and others feel that there is still a vital role for the Health and Safety Executive to play.¹²⁹

107. The safety record of professional drivers is generally good but the union Unite has shown the problems of tiredness and fatigue that can arise, particularly on long shifts and night-time working.¹³⁰

108. We have described above (see Vehicles) the sorts of technologies that are increasingly available to reduce road casualties. These could make a major difference to work-related deaths and help to introduce safer vehicles into the wider UK car fleet.

109. The Government should work with employers’ organisations and trades unions on the issue of work-related road accidents, including an evaluation of its Driving for Better Business initiative. It should use the tools at its disposal, including fiscal and financial incentives, to encourage employers to use vehicles with additional proven safety features. This would help to reduce work-related casualties and speed the adoption of these features into the wider UK vehicle fleet.

110. It is anomalous that the vast majority of work-related deaths are not examined by the Health and Safety Executive, purely because they occur on the roads. The Government should review the role of the Health and Safety Executive with regard to road safety to ensure that it fulfils its unique role in the strategy beyond 2010.

Drinking and driving

111. There has been no progress in reducing casualties from drink-drive accidents. The numbers of deaths (460) is now exactly as it was in 1998.¹³¹ In the intervening years it rose to 580. As the total number of road deaths has decreased, drink drive deaths have become a larger percentage of the total – some 16% in 2007. Although 2007 saw a fall in drink-drive deaths there was an overall increase in drink-drive accidents.

112. The analysis by TRL in 2007 identified drink-drive casualties as a policy area where progress had not been made in accordance with the Government’s road safety strategy. The assumption was that the drink-drive limit would be lowered in line with other European countries and that enforcement levels would be maintained. In the event, the limit was not lowered and the numbers of drink-drive tests fell during the early years of this millennium (although recently they have risen).

127 HSE website July 2008: www.hse.gov.uk/statistics

128 Work and Pensions Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2003–04, The Work of the Health and Safety Commission and Executive, HC 456

129 Q 154

130 Ev 319

131 Department for Transport, *Road Casualties Great Britain 2007: Annual Report*, September 2008, Table 3a

113. Enforcement of drink driving offences is a matter for Chief Police officers and is therefore outside the direct control of the Department for Transport. Enforcement levels have varied over time and across police forces. Roads policing has not been a priority for the Home Office over the past decade and this remains the case.¹³²

114. The UK drink drive limit is 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood. Most other European countries have a lower blood alcohol limit than the UK (typically 50mg/100ml), though the penalties are less severe at the lower end of the scale. According to the Association of Chief Police Officers the UK is isolated with the highest blood alcohol limit in Europe. "It is seen by our European neighbours as condoning drink driving."¹³³ The Association of Chief Police Officers also identifies the serious issue of driving whilst under the influence of illegal drugs.

115. Many groups have called for greater enforcement and a reduction in the blood alcohol limit as a part of a strategy to reduce drink driving. "RAC would support a reduction in the UK drink-drive limit to 50mg per 100ml of blood in line with other EU countries. In addition, RAC believes such a reduction should be accompanied by increased detection and continued focus on the most serious offenders."¹³⁴

116. Even some of those organisations which have traditionally opposed a reduction are changing their position in recognition of support by drivers for lower limits. Over two-thirds of Automobile Association members support a reduction in the legal limit and the Automobile Association has now changed its position to one of 'not objecting' to a reduction.¹³⁵ Among our witnesses, only the Association of British Drivers, a much smaller organisation, still opposes a reduction.¹³⁶

117. There appears to be a growing consensus¹³⁷ that the limit should be reduced from 80mg/100ml to 50mg/100ml which is the standard in most other European countries. Whereas, at present, drivers might think they can consume one or two alcoholic drinks and remain under the limit, the lower level would make it clear that "none for the road" was the only option. It would not, however, penalise those drivers who had consumed very small amounts of alcohol, say in a liqueur chocolate. The lower limit would require a more graduated penalty regime. It would provide the opportunity to simplify and relaunch the anti-drink-driving campaign which seems to have lost its impact. It would need to be adequately resourced and given appropriate priority by the Home Office.

118. We understand that the Department is to shortly consult on proposals to address the problem of drink-drive collisions. As in our report on *Novice Drivers*, we welcome this much-needed investigation and look forward to a thorough examination of what should be the permitted blood alcohol concentration for drivers. Should our recommendation for a lower alcohol limit for novice drivers be implemented, this

132 Ev 239

133 Ev 239

134 Ev 197

135 Qq 307-308

136 Ev 139

137 Qq 307-308

would provide further useful evidence on the impact of a lower alcohol limit for drivers in general.

119. It is unacceptable that such a major element of the Government's road safety strategy can be given such a low priority by a key department. It is imperative that the Home Office gives much higher priority to enforcement of drink-drive and drug-drive offences. This should include the type-approval of roadside evidential breath-testing devices and development of equipment to assist the police to identify and prosecute drug-impaired drivers.

Enforcement

120. There are strong links between criminal behaviour and road safety.¹³⁸ Unlicensed, uninsured and untaxed driving, dangerous driving, drink driving and excessive speed are all strongly linked with road casualties. Witnesses from opposite ends of the road safety spectrum, including the Association of British Drivers and Brake, have called for more roads policing, as indeed we have previously.¹³⁹ We were pleased to hear the Minister agree with us that there should be more roads policing.¹⁴⁰ However, the powers to influence these matters lie elsewhere in Government.

121. We were shocked to hear that, in some parts of the country, including areas of Bradford, an estimated 57% of resident vehicles are being driven uninsured, leading to significant social problems and dangers on the streets.¹⁴¹ These figures are compiled by the Motor Insurers' Bureau and are available to the local authorities and police.

122. It was also disconcerting to hear that, having purchased enforcement equipment for police to use, the local authorities in West Yorkshire have to pay the police overtime to use it because the police performance framework does not allow the police to use it in normal police time.¹⁴²

123. There has been an increase in the seizure and crushing of untaxed or unlicensed vehicles by VOSA and the police in the past year or so. Some 150,000 vehicles were impounded by the authorities in 2007. There is some indication that the significant reduction in deaths in 2007 may be partly due to the increase in seizure of untaxed or unlicensed vehicles.¹⁴³

124. The connections between unlicensed, untaxed or uninsured vehicles, crime and anti-social behaviour, and road safety need to be more widely acted upon. We welcome the recent increase in enforcement activity by VOSA. This must be continued and consistently applied in all areas. The lack of congruity between the priorities of the

138 Broughton, J, *The correlation between motoring offences and other types of offence*. TRL Report TRL650, 2006

139 Transport Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2005–06, *Roads Policing and Technology: Getting the right balance*, HC 975, 31 October 2006

140 Q 409

141 Qq 188–193

142 Q 185 [Mr Thornton]

143 Qq 415, 435

Home Office and the Department for Transport on road safety continues to be of great concern to us.

4 Delivery

Role of Government in road safety

125. Our witnesses were clear that the Government has a number of important roles to play with regard to road safety. These include:

- Leadership;
- coordinating strategy across departments;
- integrating road safety with other policy, such as health and environment ;
- research; and
- funding.

126. In the main, witnesses felt that the Government should do more of all of these things. They particularly wanted stronger leadership – at Prime Minister or Cabinet level, as in France¹⁴⁴ – and better support for road safety across government departments. Research was generally seen as good but the results were not always carried through to implementation.

127. The road safety strategy cannot be delivered by the Department for Transport alone. During the course of our inquiry, the Road Safety Delivery Board – a cross-departmental body recommended in the 2007 progress review – held its first meeting.¹⁴⁵ The Minister outlined to us some of the discussions that he and his department are having with other Government departments, including the Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills, the Department of Health, the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office.¹⁴⁶ We note the statements by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the Department of Culture Media and Sport on the importance of creating safe environments for children to walk, play and cycle. We also note that Department of Children Schools and Families is taking a greater interest in road safety issues following the White Paper “Every Child Matters”. We welcome all this, as did our witnesses.¹⁴⁷

128. It is, however, evident that the road safety strategy has not had the full support of some of the most crucial departments since it was launched in 2000. As noted earlier in this report, the Home Office has given roads policing a low priority and Mrs Berry, Chairman of the Police Federation in England and Wales, questioned whether road safety targets now being set in local area agreements would be supported by the performance framework set by the Home Office.¹⁴⁸ The Health and Safety Executive has been reluctant to get involved in work-related road deaths and the Department of Health barely features in the original

144 Ev 297

145 On 26 March 2008 – see Ev 94.

146 Qq 358, 360

147 Q 313

148 Q 155 [Mrs Berry]

strategy. We do not doubt the willingness of the Department for Transport to engage with these other departments but we question its ability to get them to deliver.

129. It is vital that the Government provides leadership on road safety at the highest level and ensures that all Government departments play a full part in the future strategy. We are encouraged by the discussions going on between the Department for Transport and other departments. This needs to result in action across the board.

Road Safety Commission

130. Despite the best intentions of the Government and road safety professionals, progress with reducing deaths since 2000 has been inadequate and the reported reduction in serious injuries is questionable. Only a major shift in thinking and priority is likely to change this. The Government has not demonstrated sufficient rigour in monitoring progress; nor has it demonstrated sufficient high-level leadership or concerted cross-departmental action.

131. Some form of high-level, independent body is needed to ensure concerted Government action and a step-change in progress. This might be a Royal Commission for road safety. In recent years Royal Commissions have been set up to address major health and transport issues, such as the Royal Commission into Environmental Pollution. We believe that a quarter of a million people killed or injured every year warrants such a body.¹⁴⁹

132. We do not believe that the Department for Transport's forthcoming road safety strategy review will have sufficient profile or the necessary cross-governmental authority to bring about the fundamental and long-term change that is needed. We therefore recommend that the Government establishes an authoritative and independent road safety commission that has powers to work across the whole of Government. The role of the commission should be to ensure that the Government gives high priority and adequate resources to road safety and that all government departments and agencies give active support. It should also have responsibility for monitoring progress, and developing more rigorous and holistic assessments. It might also investigate good practice, particularly in those countries that have overtaken the UK in road safety standards.

Vision and targets

133. There was a considerable view that a broader vision for road safety was needed. Numerical targets are important but they are not particularly meaningful for the general public. The Swedish Vision Zero and the Dutch sustainable safety vision give a stronger sense of the ultimate objective.

134. As we have shown above, many people see road safety as a much broader issue than casualty reduction alone. There are conflicting perspectives and sometimes competing road safety priorities. Although most people will agree on the overarching objective of reducing death and injury, quality of life, danger reduction, and associated policy

¹⁴⁹ A Forum for Preventing Deaths in Custody was established in 2006, following a recommendation by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

objectives must be part of the vision. Bold measures will only gain widespread support if the broader issues are addressed.

135. Road safety is not a morally-neutral area. Issues inevitably arise regarding how far it is right for the state to restrict personal freedom – including the ‘right to drive’ – in order to reduce death and injury. Our witnesses were clear that a degree of risk-taking is inevitable and even desirable and that some level of injury is bound to result. Even the Swedish Vision Zero does not attempt to eliminate all deaths where individuals deliberately put themselves at risk. We agree with our witness who said we should not have the right to put other people lives at risk by the way we exercise our freedom.¹⁵⁰ We feel that the Government’s main duty should be to try to protect road users from risks imposed by others and then to protect road users from the worst consequences of their own mistakes.

136. A new vision is needed for road safety in Britain beyond 2010. This should be underpinned by a strategy that explains how casualty reduction, danger reduction and the various other important policy objectives, such as a sustainable transport system, economic efficiency, climate change, social inclusion and physical health are integrated. Priorities must also be clarified. Widespread consultation is needed that takes in the complexities of the issues.

137. There is general agreement that the national targets have helped at a strategic level to focus resources and efforts on casualty reduction. There is also support for adopting challenging new targets beyond 2010. Because of the divergence in trends of deaths and injuries, there is support for having a target for reducing deaths that is separate from any target for reducing injuries.

138. Support for simple casualty reduction targets is not universal. Living Streets contends that “an obsession with targets for casualty reduction has contributed to pedestrians being designed out of the urban environment.”¹⁵¹ The CTC reported that although the Department for Transport was promoting casualty reduction *and* cycle use, some local authorities have interpreted the road safety target as a reason not to encourage cycling.¹⁵²

139. Other witnesses pointed out that casualty reduction targets that do not take account of levels of exposure (use) can mask important trends.¹⁵³ This is not necessarily an argument for not having casualty reduction targets but one that shows the need to pursue multiple objectives and better monitoring. Dr Christie, and groups representing vulnerable road users (including motorcyclists) stressed the importance of monitoring casualty rates – deaths and injuries relative to the amount of distance travelled or hours of ‘exposure’.¹⁵⁴ This is difficult to achieve accurately at local level but is more reliable at national level.

140. The Government should adopt a national target for reducing deaths, which is separate from any targets for reducing serious or slight injuries. The Government should also adopt a national target for reducing deaths and serious injuries. This

150 Q 159 [Mr Clinton]

151 Ev 176

152 Ev 179, 184

153 Ev 232

154 Ev 310

combined target should also be applied at local level where performance monitoring should take account of the inevitable fluctuations in casualties from year to year.

141. It is essential that, at both national and local level, casualty reduction targets are seen in the context of promoting sustainable transport.

142. It is not for us to specify the level of casualty reductions to be targeted. These will need to be based on technical analysis of options, resources and trends, and may be adjusted at local level. As an ambition, however, we believe that the Government should be setting the bar high, perhaps as follows:

- Reduce deaths below 2,000 by 2020; and below 1,000 by 2030.
- Reduce deaths and serious injuries below 20,000 by 2020 and below 10,000 by 2030.

143. These suggested reductions are in line with the targets set in the 2000 strategy. They are also broadly consistent with the ‘pragmatic’ vision recommended by PACTS whereby road risk should be reduced to not more than twice that experienced elsewhere in everyday life.¹⁵⁵

144. The IAM Motoring Trust recommends a long-term target of 20–25 years with intermediate 5-year targets and reviews. It states that

Experience of the past two target rounds suggests that 10-year target periods may not be the most effective approach. Most elements of both casualty reduction targets have been met within the determined period, leaving a sense of hiatus until new targets are set.¹⁵⁶

145. We feel the suggestion of a long term target of 20–25 years, with intermediate 5-year targets and reviews, is something that the Government should consider carefully in arriving at new targets.

146. There is less agreement about exactly how or which national targets should be applied at local level. The Institute of Highway Incorporated Engineers (IHIE) points to local authority ‘target fatigue’ and stresses the need to ‘re-engage’ the public.¹⁵⁷ The Audit Commission, TRL, the CSS and Scottish road safety professionals pointed out that annual targets were not always meaningful at local level because of the fluctuations in casualty numbers and the small number of casualties in some local authority areas.¹⁵⁸

147. There should be flexibility for local authorities and Local Area Agreements to set their own additional local road safety targets, to suit local priorities and needs. These might include indicators other than casualties. Whilst reducing deaths must be an overriding priority, deaths are not necessarily a meaningful indicator of performance

155 PACTS, op.cit.

156 Ev 192

157 Ev 149

158 Ev 143, 217, 236, 324

or priorities at the local level where the numbers will be small. Reducing casualties in the most deprived areas may be a priority in some local authority areas.

Improved data and monitoring

148. The Department for Transport has relied on a relatively narrow range of data to monitor road safety. Various organisations emphasise the need to monitor additional factors and from additional sources to give a more rounded picture. These might include the percentage of people obeying the speed limit, changes in the amounts of walking and cycling, the percentage of roads with 20-mph speed limits and the number of breath tests undertaken by the police. Some of these, such as breath tests, are means-to-an-end and not objectives in their own rights. As such, it is more appropriate to monitor them rather than to set additional targets for them. Some of these data are available elsewhere but not brought together to provide a holistic picture of road safety.

149. With regard to the overarching issue of deaths and injuries, we agree with the recommendation in research commissioned by the Government that

This and other studies have shown that it is insufficient to rely solely on STATS19 data, or on any one data source for an assessment of trends in serious injury. That different databases show different parts of the picture is useful and it is recommended that greater use be made of all sources. A system of data triangulation should be used to compare and understand trends in road casualties.¹⁵⁹

150. Greater independent monitoring and scrutiny of progress is required. Progress should be monitored against a range of indicators, not all of which need to be targets. This would include the British Road Safety Survey. The main casualty reduction targets must be monitored against both police and hospital data and overseen by the independent commission.

Road-safety professionals

151. Delivering a more ambitious, innovative and effective road safety strategy will require a range of professional skills. Witnesses pointed out that to train, recruit and retain people with the appropriate skills, secure, long-term funding was essential. Some skills are in short supply:

- The CSS and IHIE identified a range of issues, including a lack of formal training and the need to reverse the decline in graduates entering the civil and highway engineering and planning professions from which many road safety professionals are drawn.¹⁶⁰
- Future roads and vehicles will include much more safety technology. This will require specialists who understand intelligent transport systems.

¹⁵⁹ Ward, H, Lyons, R and Thoreau, R, *Underreporting of casualties – Phase 1*, Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report 69, June 2006, p11.

¹⁶⁰ Ev 324 and Qq 147–149

- The Police Federation pointed to the reduction in dedicated roads policing officers.¹⁶¹
- Due to fluctuations in funding levels and priorities, there are also difficulties in staffing the expanded programme of child pedestrian training.¹⁶²

152. Communication and consultation skills are also much needed. These include the skills to engage with local people. As Mr Thornton of the West Yorkshire Road Safety Strategy Group stated:

I do not think we have engaged enough with local communities and roads users as a whole. We are still trying to say that professionals deliver road safety and virtually exclude the influence that people can have on their own safety and the safety of people they come into contact with. It is really important to say that local people deliver road safety as much as we do.¹⁶³

153. Mr Lynam and others emphasised that simply continuing with current policies would be inadequate and that new measures and lateral thinking were required.¹⁶⁴ This is likely to require people from outside the traditional road safety professions.

154. Consistent and adequate long-term funding is required in order to attract and retain the calibre of road safety professional that is required to deliver the road safety strategy.

155. It is evident that the context is different for safety professionals in different transport modes. Whilst some differences are inevitable, there are opportunities for greater exchange of ideas and expertise across transport sectors.

156. The approach taken to investigating accidents differs sharply across the transport modes and there is insufficient cross-over between road and the other modes. The systems approach that is routine in marine, rail and aviation accident investigation and prevention is much less apparent in road safety. The Government should facilitate greater exchange of personnel, ideas and learning across the modes.

157. The Government should establish a road accident investigation branch, to parallel those for aviation, marine and rail. Its purpose would be to draw together lessons from the fatal accident investigations undertaken by police and other sources.

161 Ev 285

162 Ev 285

163 Q 160 [Mr Thornton]

164 Q 58

5 Conclusion

158. The number of deaths and injuries on our roads far outweighs the deaths and injuries in other transport modes or in other work-related accidents. It is time that we stopped seeing this as a collection of individual tragedies and started viewing it as the major public health problem of our age. Because young people are disproportionately affected, more life-years are lost due to road accidents than any other single cause. For decades every road safety minister has prefaced his or her speeches with a reference to this terrible toll; yet this is not news and somehow it is accepted. PACTS has called this the “scandal of tolerance”.¹⁶⁵ We should tolerate it no longer. A bolder and more integrated strategy is required beyond 2010 to restore the UK to its position as a world leader in road safety.

¹⁶⁵ PACTS, *op.cit.*, p24

Conclusions and recommendations

Progress towards the 2010 targets

1. We commend the Government on having set and maintained ambitious road traffic casualty reduction targets. We also commend it for recognising that road safety needs to be integrated with other important policy objectives such as promoting good health, reducing carbon-dioxide emissions, tackling deprivation and improving quality of life. The Government has not sought to reduce casualties by discouraging vulnerable road users from taking to the streets; but some trends, such as increased traffic, have had this effect. We recommend that in the forthcoming White Paper on sustainable transport, road safety objectives should be integrated with these wider objectives. We also recommend that the road safety strategy for beyond 2010 be explicitly set in the context of wider policy objectives. This should help to ensure that road safety is seen as relevant in other policy areas and that road safety policies do not have unintended consequences on other important objectives, such as improving public health by encouraging walking, cycling and play. (Paragraph 15)
2. We urge the Government to renew its focus on tackling the appalling level of child road traffic deaths associated with deprivation. (Paragraph 20)
3. The Government should establish a British Road Safety Survey to track overall casualty and safety trends. This would be a structured survey, gathered from a statistically significant sample of households, similar to the National Travel Survey. It would, therefore, not rely on levels of reporting by road users or police. It would be akin to the British Crime Survey which is seen as a more reliable long-term monitor of crime than the police crime statistics. This would involve original survey work, and might also draw on existing data sources, including police, hospital and insurance company data, to obtain a more rounded picture. A survey would have the additional benefit of being able to monitor attitudes to road safety including, for example, the fears of vulnerable road-users. (Paragraph 31)
4. There is a significant body of evidence to suggest that the current methods for recording road-traffic injuries are flawed. We recommend that the Government commissions an independent review of the STATS19 system in order to establish its strengths and weaknesses, bearing in mind our recommendation above for a British Road Safety Survey. The review should also examine ways in which the system could be simplified, with a view to promoting greater consistency, and consider ways of routinely linking police and hospital data. (Paragraph 34)

Priorities beyond 2010

5. The systems approach to road safety, now adopted by the Netherlands, Sweden and elsewhere is different to that pursued by the UK. We believe that it is time for the UK to move towards this more fundamental approach which is accepted for other transport modes. The Department for Transport needs to explore this approach further and to engage the public in a discussion of the ideas and implications. (Paragraph 51)

6. The emphasis needs to shift from treating localised problems to one of long-term improvements to the safety of the infrastructure. At the same time, it is essential that a multi-disciplinary approach is taken to ensure that safety measures are compatible with a good quality local environment. (Paragraph 57)
7. Ways must be found to satisfy the desires of local communities for safer streets. We recommend that local authorities be given the powers and resources to introduce 20-mph limits much more widely. Flexibility is required to avoid the prohibitive costs associated with some approaches. The balance of engineering measures, technology, policing and community influence should be a local matter. Systems, however, must not rely on high levels of fines or draconian enforcement. (Paragraph 60)
8. The Government should take a more proactive approach to determining the safety benefits of new vehicle technologies. It should make clear which ones it believes have most safety benefits and encourage their adoption into the UK vehicle fleet. The Government should use the various tools at its disposal, including fiscal and financial incentives, to encourage employers to use vehicles with additional proven safety features. Government departments and agencies should also give a lead in their fleet purchasing decisions. This would help to reduce work-related casualties and speed up the adoption of these features into the wider UK vehicle fleet. (Paragraph 66)
9. There are clear links between uninsured and unlicensed driving, and crash involvement. A twin-track approach is needed. The Government should encourage greater partnership working at local level to prevent offending by young people. At the same time, greater levels of enforcement are needed to prevent uninsured and unlicensed driving. The Committee recommends the Department for Transport identify projects of this type that have been successful and disseminate these more widely. (Paragraph 71)
10. We support the Government's efforts to revise the driver training system and to place greater emphasis on attitudes and behaviours as well as driving skills. The proposals in Learning to Drive are steps in the right direction, but we are not confident that they will be sufficient to arrest the carnage of young drivers on our roads. We recommend that the Government takes bolder and more urgent steps to cut the number of collisions involving young drivers, particularly young men. We urge that it reconsiders its response to our recommendations in Novice Drivers regarding a graduated licensing scheme and, in particular (p36), restrictions on young drivers carrying teenage passengers between the hours of 11pm and 5am. (Paragraph 75)
11. More link-up is needed between the various road safety education programmes. It is disappointing that, in a relatively wide-ranging review of driver training, the Government has not consulted on the possibility of strengthening links between driver training, and pedestrian and cyclist training in the ways that some local authorities are doing. We recommend that the Department for Transport and the Department for Children, Schools and Families consider ways in which a range of road-user training schemes might be targeted at school students of the appropriate ages. (Paragraph 77)

12. We recommend that the Government redoubles its efforts to improve the safety of motorcyclists and to ensure that their safety is seen as central to its road safety strategy. This needs to be communicated effectively to all parties involved with road safety. (Paragraph 81)
13. The causes of motorcyclist accidents and remedial measures need to be thoroughly investigated and the results communicated to road safety professionals, motorcyclists and other road users. (Paragraph 82)
14. It is unsatisfactory that so few children are given pedestrian or cycle training at school. Whereas there is a plethora of statistics on school-related matters, the percentage of children receiving road safety training is not monitored. We welcome the Department for Transport's support for Kerbcraft and, more recently, for Bikeability training. However, the Government should frame its targets in terms of the percentage, rather than the absolute number, of children in the target age group to be trained. The timescales for implementing these schemes must be reduced; and they should be properly monitored and supported with long-term resources to ensure that they are available to all children. We recommend that the Government investigates the effects that the compulsory wearing of cycle helmets by children would have on casualties. (Paragraph 89)
15. We note that there is a wealth of educational materials aimed at pre-school and primary age youngsters. However, we are concerned that similar efforts have not been made to produce material for pupils in secondary school. We believe that there needs to be a more co-ordinated approach to the provision of such materials and a consolidated approach to risk education across the age range. (Paragraph 91)
16. Elsewhere in this Report, we have identified the apparent mismatch between data sets in terms of the number of actual casualties compared with those recorded. We believe that it is important for local highway authorities to have as accurate a picture as possible of the number of people killed or injured in their area and of the costs of preventing these injuries. We encourage these authorities to gather and publish such information in addition to the STATS19 data. (Paragraph 95)
17. We recommend that cycle training should be offered as an alternative to fines for offending cyclists, just as driver retraining courses are now commonly offered to motorists who commit minor traffic offences. (Paragraph 96)
18. We recognise the vulnerability of older drivers and their increasing numbers. We do not believe that automatic, mandatory retesting of drivers above a certain age is justified. We favour the more positive approach of simplifying the driving task and protecting drivers from the more serious consequences of their errors. Making walking and public transport more attractive to older people, with initiatives such as 20-mph limits and accessible vehicles, should also be encouraged. Schemes to provide assistance to older drivers are also to be encouraged. (Paragraph 101)
19. We recommend that the Government urgently review the increasing use and safety of mobility scooters with a view to establishing whether safety guidelines or mandatory training would be beneficial. (Paragraph 104)

20. The Government should work with employers' organisations and trades unions on the issue of work-related road accidents, including an evaluation of its Driving for Better Business initiative. It should use the tools at its disposal, including fiscal and financial incentives, to encourage employers to use vehicles with additional proven safety features. This would help to reduce work-related casualties and speed the adoption of these features into the wider UK vehicle fleet. (Paragraph 109)
21. It is anomalous that the vast majority of work-related deaths are not examined by the Health and Safety Executive, purely because they occur on the roads. The Government should review the role of the Health and Safety Executive with regard to road safety to ensure that it fulfils its unique role in the strategy beyond 2010. (Paragraph 110)
22. We understand that the Department is to shortly consult on proposals to address the problem of drink-drive collisions. As in our report on Novice Drivers, we welcome this much-needed investigation and look forward to a thorough examination of what should be the permitted blood alcohol concentration for drivers. Should our recommendation for a lower alcohol limit for novice drivers be implemented, this would provide further useful evidence on the impact of a lower alcohol limit for drivers in general. (Paragraph 118)
23. It is unacceptable that such a major element of the Government's road safety strategy can be given such a low priority by a key department. It is imperative that the Home Office gives much higher priority to enforcement of drink-drive and drug-drive offences. This should include the type-approval of roadside evidential breath-testing devices and development of equipment to assist the police to identify and prosecute drug-impaired drivers. (Paragraph 119)
24. The connections between unlicensed, untaxed or uninsured vehicles, crime and anti-social behaviour, and road safety need to be more widely acted upon. We welcome the recent increase in enforcement activity by VOSA. This must be continued and consistently applied in all areas. The lack of congruity between the priorities of the Home Office and the Department for Transport on road safety continues to be of great concern to us. (Paragraph 124)

Delivery

25. It is vital that the Government provides leadership on road safety at the highest level and ensures that all Government departments play a full part in the future strategy. We are encouraged by the discussions going on between the Department for Transport and other departments. This needs to result in action across the board. (Paragraph 129)
26. We do not believe that the Department for Transport's forthcoming road safety strategy review will have sufficient profile or the necessary cross-governmental authority to bring about the fundamental and long-term change that is needed. We therefore recommend that the Government establishes an authoritative and independent road safety commission that has powers to work across the whole of Government. The role of the commission should be to ensure that the Government

gives high priority and adequate resources to road safety and that all government departments and agencies give active support. It should also have responsibility for monitoring progress, and developing more rigorous and holistic assessments. It might also investigate good practice, particularly in those countries that have overtaken the UK in road safety standards. (Paragraph 132)

27. A new vision is needed for road safety in Britain beyond 2010. This should be underpinned by a strategy that explains how casualty reduction, danger reduction and the various other important policy objectives, such as a sustainable transport system, economic efficiency, climate change, social inclusion and physical health are integrated. Priorities must also be clarified. Widespread consultation is needed that takes in the complexities of the issues. (Paragraph 136)
28. The Government should adopt a national target for reducing deaths, which is separate from any targets for reducing serious or slight injuries. The Government should also adopt a national target for reducing deaths and serious injuries. This combined target should also be applied at local level where performance monitoring should take account of the inevitable fluctuations in casualties from year to year. (Paragraph 140)
29. It is essential that, at both national and local level, casualty reduction targets are seen in the context of promoting sustainable transport. (Paragraph 141)
30. We feel the suggestion of a long term target of 20–25 years, with intermediate 5-year targets and reviews, is something that the Government should consider carefully in arriving at new targets. (Paragraph 145)
31. There should be flexibility for local authorities and Local Area Agreements to set their own additional local road safety targets, to suit local priorities and needs. These might include indicators other than casualties. Whilst reducing deaths must be an overriding priority, deaths are not necessarily a meaningful indicator of performance or priorities at the local level where the numbers will be small. Reducing casualties in the most deprived areas may be a priority in some local authority areas. (Paragraph 147)
32. Greater independent monitoring and scrutiny of progress is required. Progress should be monitored against a range of indicators, not all of which need to be targets. This would include the British Road Safety Survey. The main casualty reduction targets must be monitored against both police and hospital data and overseen by the independent commission. (Paragraph 150)
33. Consistent and adequate long-term funding is required in order to attract and retain the calibre of road safety professional that is required to deliver the road safety strategy. (Paragraph 154)
34. The approach taken to investigating accidents differs sharply across the transport modes and there is insufficient cross-over between road and the other modes. The systems approach that is routine in marine, rail and aviation accident investigation and prevention is much less apparent in road safety. The Government should

facilitate greater exchange of personnel, ideas and learning across the modes.
(Paragraph 156)

35. The Government should establish a road accident investigation branch, to parallel those for aviation, marine and rail. Its purpose would be to draw together lessons from the fatal accident investigations undertaken by police and other sources.
(Paragraph 157)

Formal Minutes

WEDNESDAY 15 OCTOBER 2008

Members present:

Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair

Mr David Clelland	Mr Mark Pritchard
Mr Philip Hollobone	David Simpson
Mr Eric Martlew	Mr Graham Stringer
Mr John Leech	Mr David Wilshire

The Following declarations of interest relating to the inquiry were made:

15 October 2008

Mrs Louise Ellman declared the following interest:

Co-chairmanship of Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety.

Draft Report (*Ending the Scandal of Complacency: Road safety beyond 2010*), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 117 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 118 read.

Question put, That the paragraph stand part of the Report.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5	Noes, 1
Mr David Clelland	Mr John Leech
Mr Philip Hollobone	
Mr Eric Martlew	
David Simpson	
Mr Graham Stringer	

Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraphs 119 to 158 read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Eleventh Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report.

Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for placing in the Library and Parliamentary Archives.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 22 October at 2.30 pm.]

Witnesses

Wednesday 26 March 2008

Page

Professor Danny Dorling, Professor of Human Geography, University of Sheffield, **Dr Nicola Christie**, Head of Surrey Injury Research Group, University of Surrey, **David Lynam OBE**, Chief Research Scientist, TRL (Transport Research Laboratory),

Ev 1

Professor Richard Allsop OBE, Professor of Transport Studies, University College London, **Heather Ward**, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University College London, **Nick Starling**, Director of General Insurance and Health, Association of British Insurers

Ev 9

Wednesday 30 April 2008

Rob Salmon, Assistant Head of Highways & Transport, West Sussex County Council, County Surveyors' Society, **Chris Lines**, Head of London Road Safety Unit, TfL, Technical Advisers Group, **Neal Skelton**, Head of Professional Services, Intelligent Transport Society UK, **Paul Everitt**, Chief Executive, Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders

Ev 17

Kevin Clinton, Head of Road Safety, Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents, **Steve Thornton**, Chairman, Principal Engineer – Traffic and Highways Bradford South, West Yorkshire Road Safety Strategy Group, **Chief Constable Steve Green**, Head of Roads Policing, Association of Chief Police Officers, **Stuart Smith**, Assistant Chief Fire Officer, Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Services, Chief Fire Officers' Association, **Jan Berry**, Chairman, Police Federation of England and Wales

Ev 26

Wednesday 14 May 2008

Professor Phil Goodwin, Professor of Transport Policy, University of the West of England, **Professor John Whitelegg**, Professor of sustainable Development, University of York, **Fred Wegman**, Managing Director, SWOV (Netherlands Institute for Road Safety Research)

Ev 36

Andrew Howard, Head of Road Safety, Automobile Association, **Nicholas Brown**, General Secretary, Motorcycle Action Group, **Malcolm Heymer**, Traffic Management Advisor, Association of British Drivers, **Jack Semple**, Director of Policy, Road Haulage Association, **Roger Sealey**, Researcher – Transport, Unite the Union (Transport & General)

Ev 46

Wednesday 21 May 2008

Adrian Voce, Director, Play England, **David Sinclair**, Head of Policy, Help the Aged, **Tony Armstrong**, Chief Executive, Living Streets, **Roger Geffen**, Campaigns & Policy Manager, CTC, the national cyclists' organisation

Ev 56

Jim Fitzpatrick MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, **Mike Fawcett**, Head of Road User Safety Division, Department for Transport

Ev 65

List of written evidence

1	Department for Transport	Ev 80, 82, 87, 89, 105, 357
2	CTC Yorkshire and Humber Region	Ev 111
3	Patricia Heathfield	Ev 112
4	David Slinger	Ev 112
5	Peter Cossins	Ev 113
6	Rev. Brian M Cave	Ev 115
7	British Red Cross	Ev 122
8	Stephen Plowden	Ev 126
9	Motorcycle Action Group (MAG UK)	Ev 128
10	dbda	Ev 130
11	Association of British Drivers	Ev 133
12	Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA)	Ev 138
13	Transport Research Laboratory (TRL)	Ev 143
14	Sarah Joiner	Ev 148
15	Institute of Highway Incorporated Engineers (IHIE)	Ev 149
16	RAC Foundation for Motoring	Ev 153
17	Association of British Insurers (ABI)	Ev 156
18	REFLECT	Ev 158
19	TTC Group	Ev 159
20	Freight Transport Association (FTA)	Ev 161
21	Help the Aged	Ev 164
22	Dtec International Ltd	Ev 168
23	RoadPeace	Ev 171
24	Play England	Ev 175
25	Living Streets	Ev 176
26	CTC	Ev 179, 184
27	Sustrans	Ev 187
28	IAM Motoring Trust	Ev 192
29	The British Horse Society (BHS)	Ev 196
30	RAC	Ev 197
31	Gavin Smith	Ev 200
32	European Secure Vehicle Alliance (ESVA)	Ev 202
33	Guide Dogs for the Blind Association and the Joint Committee on the Mobility of Blind and Partially Sighted People	Ev 203
34	The Automobile Association (AA)	Ev 206
35	TRAVELSAFE	Ev 210
36	GoSkills	Ev 212
37	Motor Cycle Industry Association	Ev 214
38	Audit Commission	Ev 217
39	Ian Belchamber	Ev 218
40	Barbara Davy	Ev 221
41	British Motorcyclists Federation (BMF)	Ev 224
42	RoadSafe	Ev 225
43	Transport for London (TfL)	Ev 228

44	Dr Ian Walker, University of Bath	Ev 232
45	Institute of Road Safety Officers (IRSO) Scotland, and the Scottish Accident Prevention Council	Ev 236
46	Retail Motor Industry Federation (RMIF)	Ev 238
47	Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)	Ev 239
48	Oliver Carsten, University of Leeds	Ev 243
49	James C Walker, JCW Consulting	Ev 246
50	West Yorkshire Road Safety Strategy Group	Ev 250
51	South Yorkshire Casualty Reduction Tactical Group	Ev 254
52	Road Haulage Association (RHA)	Ev 256
53	The Patrick Foundation	Ev 259
54	The Institution of Highways & Transportation (IHT)	Ev 266
55	The Under 17 Car Club	Ev 268
56	Idris Francis	Ev 272
57	ITS (UK) (Intelligent Transport Society for the United Kingdom)	Ev 278
58	esure	Ev 283
59	Police Federation of England and Wales	Ev 285
60	Brake	Ev 289
61	Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS)	Ev 294
62	Technical Advisors Group (TAG)	Ev 297
63	Roger Fell	Ev 301
64	Alan Gillard	Ev 309
65	Dr Nicola Christie, University of Surrey	Ev 310
66	Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT)	Ev 312
67	Network Rail	Ev 315
68	N. and M. Tweddell, S. Blandy and S. Schmoller	Ev 317
69	Unite the Union	Ev 319
70	Professor Danny Dorling, University of Sheffield	Ev 323
71	County Surveyors' Society	Ev 324
72	Nottingham City Council's Road Safety Team	Ev 326
73	Professor John Whitelegg	Ev 327
74	Norwich Union	Ev 332
75	Road Safety Foundation	Ev 333
76	British Medical Association (BMA)	Ev 335
77	Rod King 20's Plenty For Us	Ev 337
78	Matt Allen	Ev 342
79	Department for Transport, Trade Union Side	Ev 343
80	Steven Adelantado	Ev 345
81	The College of Emergency Medicine	Ev 346, 356
82	Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service	Ev 349

List of unprinted evidence

The following memoranda have been reported to the House, but to save printing costs they have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Parliamentary Archives, and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to The Parliamentary Archives, Houses of Parliament, London SW1A 0PW (tel. 020 7219 3074). Opening hours are from 9.30 am to 5.00 pm on Mondays to Fridays.

Under 17 Car Club – annexes

Road Safety Foundation – Maps

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

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Third Special Report	The future of BAA: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2007–08	HC 569
Fourth Special Report	Ticketing and Concessionary Travel on Public Transport: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2007–08	HC 708
Fifth Special Report	Department for Transport Annual Report 2007: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2007–08	HC 1102
Sixth Special Report	Freight Transport: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2007–08	HC 1103
Seventh Special Report	The Draft Marine Navigation Bill: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2007–08	HC 1104
Eighth Special Report	Delivering a sustainable railway: a 30-year strategy for the railways?: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2007–08	HC 1105
Ninth Special Report	The Blue Badge Scheme: Government and Westminster City Council Responses to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2007–08	HC 1106

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Third Report	Transport for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games: The Draft Transport Plan	HC 199
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Sixth Report	The new National Boatmasters’ Licence	HC 320-I & 320-II
Seventh Report	Novice Drivers	HC 355-I & 355-II
Eighth Report	Passengers’ Experiences of Air Travel	HC 435-I & 435-II
Ninth Report	The draft Local Transport Bill and the Transport Innovation Fund	HC 692-I & 692-II
First Special Report	Passenger Rail Franchising: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourteenth Report of Session 2005–06	HC 265
Second Special Report	Roads Policing and Technology: Getting the right balance: Government Response to the Committee’s Tenth Report of Session 2005–06	HC 290
Third Special Report	Bus services across the UK: Government Response to the Committee’s Eleventh Report of Session 2005–06	HC 298
Fourth Special Report	Local Transport Planning and Funding: Government Response to the Committee’s Twelfth Report of Session 2005–06	HC 334
Fifth Special Report	The work of the Civil Aviation Authority: Government Response to the Committee’s Thirteenth Report of Session 2005–06	HC 371
Sixth Special Report	Transport for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games: The Draft Transport Plan: Olympic Delivery Authority Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2006–07	HC 484
Seventh Special Report	Department for Transport Annual Report 2006: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2006–07	HC 485
Eighth Special Report	The Government’s Motorcycling Strategy: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2006–07	HC 698
Ninth Special Report	The Ports Industry in England and Wales: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2006–07	HC 954

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Second Report	Financial Protection for Air Travellers: Second Report Abandoning Effective Protection	HC 636
Third Report	Going for Gold: Transport for London’s 2012 Olympic Games	HC 588

Fourth Report	Departmental Annual Report 2005	HC 684
Fifth Report	Future of the British Transport Police	HC 1070
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Ninth Report	The work of the Department for Transport's Executive Agencies – DVO Group and the Highways Agency	HC 907
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Second Special Report	The Departmental Annual Report 2004: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2004–05	HC 432
Third Special Report	Integrated Transport: the future of light rail and modern trams in the UK: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of session 2004–05	HC 526
Fourth Special Report	Search and Rescue: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2004–05	HC 586
Fifth Special Report	Rural Railways: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2004–05	HC 587
Sixth Special Report	Tonnage Tax: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2004–05	HC 611
Seventh Special Report	Financial Protection for Air Travellers: Government and Civil Aviation Authority Responses to the Committee's Fifteenth Report of Session 2003–04	HC 639
Eighth Special Report	European Community Competence and Transport: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2004–05	HC 976
Ninth Special Report	Financial Protection for Air Travellers: Abandoning Effective Protection: Government and Civil Aviation Authority Responses to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2005–06	HC 996
Tenth Special Report	Going for Gold: Transport for London's 2012 Olympic Games: Government Response to the committee's Third Report of Session 2005–06	HC 1152
Eleventh Special Report	Departmental Annual Report 2005: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2005–06	HC 1517

Twelfth Special Report	Future of the British Transport Police: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2005–06	HC 1639
Thirteenth Special Report	How fair are the fares? Train fares and ticketing: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2005–06	HC 1640
Fourteenth Special Report	Parking Policy and Enforcement: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2005–06	HC 1641
Fifteenth Special Report	The Work of the Department for Transport's Agencies – Driver and Vehicle Operator Group and the Highways Agency: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2005–06	HC 1615
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